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THE MONTREAL AGREEMENT AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
By JOSEPH N. ONEKt
T HE MONTREAL AGREEMENT of 1966, by instituting a limited
system of absolute liability, aroused the ire of many aviation lawyers.
It should also arouse the interest of many tort scholars. For years tort
scholars have debated the merit of non-fault liability with little oppor-
tunity to study the workings of such a system in a major industry. The
Montreal Agreement should provide them with new arguments and new
data.
I would like to speak briefly about enterprise liability. Enterprise liability
received its initial impetus from the failure of the traditional fault system
to ensure adequate compensation in an inexpensive manner. More recently,
entreprise liability has also received support from sophisticated theories of
resource allocation.
In most academic circles I would be accused of flogging a dead horse if
I discussed the inadequacies of the traditional fault system. But it appears
that among aviation lawyers the traditional system-like Pegasus-is a
high flying horse indeed. I would, therefore, like to say a few words about
the defects of the fault system.
The most obvious defect is that the fault system does not ensure adequate
compensation to many accident victims. Negligent victims may be barred
from any recovery even though their negligence was slight and their
damages great.' Their families, who are completely without fault, also
recover nothing. And even in aviation accidents, where virtually all the
victims are without fault, victims may get no recovery or an insufficient
settlement.
In international aviation the problem of insufficient recoveries has
probably assumed greater significance in recent years. There was a time
when international flights were the province only of the wealthy. These
people generally had considerable awareness of financial matters and were
likely to have adequate life or trip insurance. Today many people in
lower income brackets take international flights. Their deaths would cause
great economic hardship to their families, yet these travelers are less likely
to have enough life or trip insurance.
The inadequacy of the compensation is compounded by the fact that
the fault system has proved to be extremely unwieldly and extremely
expensive to administer. Trials are long and lawyers' fees high. This is
t LL.B., Yale; currently clerk to Chief Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. I would like to acknowledge my debt to Professor Guido Calabresi of
Yale Law School. It is no exaggeration to say that any novel ideas in this article are his and any
errors mine.
1 It is true that juries often ignore contributory negligence, or merely scale down the award
according to the relative negligence of the victim. But this is a haphazard process and does not
ensure adequate compensation. Nor does the system of comparative negligence ensure adequate
compensation.
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particularly true in a field such as aviation where proof of fault often
requires a highly technical presentation. Many foreign observers, including
Sir William Hildred, express horror at the size of the fees collected by
American lawyers. For my part, I have a feeling that under the present
system the American lawyers earn every penny they get in most cases.
But any system which requires that lawyers obtain such high fees is
clearly in need of reform.
These faults of the fault system have been fairly widely publicized.
They are commonplace to recent generations of law students. But there is
another defect of the fault system which is less widely known. It is simply
that the fault system is not a good one for rooting out fault. The case-
-by-case method grossly distorts our picture of what causes accident costs.
In each case, we tend to look for the unique feature which caused the
accident, but we ignore the underlying features which may have con-
tributed most to the costs of the accident. Thus in automobile accidents
we investigate how much the driver had to drink and whether he was
going over the speed limit, but we ignore the fact that the major damage
may have been caused by the lack of a collapsible steering wheel or a col-
lapsible front section. We have had thousands of automobile accident
trials, tried by able members of the bar, yet these trials did not lead to the
introduction of the collapsible steering wheel. The fault system is not
geared to correcting underlying defects which exist throughout an indus-
try.' And the more complex the technology, the greater the significance
of these underlying defects, as compared to the human errors we term
negligence.
Finally, as technology becomes more complex, the whole concept of
fault becomes inappropriate. An airplane design is the result of the work
of literally thousands of people. If, in a hard-to-foresee contingency, the
design proves inadequate, can we really say that a single person or even
the company as a whole is at fault in some moral sense?
The economic inadequacies of the fault system provided the initial im-
petus for enterprise liability. Recently, however, tort scholars have pointed
out that enterprise liability is also justified in terms of a rational allocation
of resources and meaningful expression of consumer preferences.' Acci-
dents and injuries are part of the costs of any activity. These accident
costs, like the more commonly considered costs of production, must be
reflected in the market price of the activities which engender them if the
consumer is able to make meaningful market decisions.
The impact on safety of making activities reflect their accident costs is
clear. If an activity must pay for its accident costs in the same way it
pays for other costs, it will constantly be under market pressure to reduce
these costs by increasing safety. This deterrence of accident costs through
the market mechanism has been aptly termed "general deterrence," in
contrast to the "specific deterrence" of accident costs through collective
Secretary General of the International Air Transport Association, 1946-1966. Sir William ex-
pressed his views at the opening session of the conference.
a A company will rarely be found negligent on the basis of a defect which exists throughout the
industry, even if the standards for the industry as a whole are too low.
' See, e.g., Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distrihution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499 (1961); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs,
78 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1965).
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law-making. s To the extent that an activity is relieved of responsibility for
accident costs, general deterrence is diminished.
The activity we are concerned with here is flying. General deterrence
will be advanced if this activity bears the accident costs it engenders. But,
since both passengers and airlines participate in this activity, general de-
terrence does not tell us which of these two groups should bear the costs.
In fact, economists have pointed out that, in theory, it does not matter
whether the costs of aviation accidents are initially borne by the airlines
or the passengers.! This is because the airline and the passengers stand in
a bargaining relationship to each other. If the accident costs are placed
on the airline, it will charge more for tickets in order to purchase liability
insurance or self-insure. If the costs are placed on the passengers, they
will wish to take out insurance and, in theory, at least, will demand that
airline prices be lowered accordingly. Either way the same market pressure
for greater safety will ultimately reach the airline.
But several practical considerations indicate that it is better to place
the costs on the airline rather than on the passengers. First the passenger
is likely to under-estimate potential accident costs and may not demand
the lower prices required to cover his insurance costs.7 Consequently, the
full cost of accidents will not be shifted back to the airline and general
deterrence will be diminished. The airline on the other hand, will likely
be able to make a more accurate assessment of accident costs. Second, it
is cheaper for the airline to obtain insurance than for the passengers indi-
vidually to insure. Thus, it is more efficient to put the costs on the airline.
Finally, it is possible that if all the accident costs were initially placed on
the passengers, the government, for reasons of social policy, might step.
in to defray the costs. This, of course, would remove the costs from the
activity of flying and reduce the economic pressure for safety. The re-
moval (externalization) of accident costs defeats the purposes of general
deterrence.
In short, as between airlines and passengers, the airlines should probably
bear the costs of aviation accidents. Since the Montreal Agreement only
deals with these two parties, I need go no further. I would like to empha-
size, however, that under a full-fledged system of enterprise liability a large
percentage of aviation accident costs might well be placed on other par-
ticipants in the activity of flying, e.g., manufacturers and air traffic con-
trol. Enterprise liability does not single out the airlines. It merely requires
that the allocation of accident costs among the various parties be based
on who can most accurately estimate these costs and most cheaply avoid
them rather than on who is negligent. The object is to allocate accident
costs in such a way as to deter any conduct which leads to accidents, not
just negligent conduct.
Enterprise liability, then, has two grounds of support. First it could
provide more adequate compensation than the fault system and do it less
expensively. But if an inexpensive system of compensation were our only
'The terms are Professor Calabresi's. See, e.g., Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful
World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216, 221 (1965).
'See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
' Potential victims tend to under-estimate the risk of accidents because of lack of knowledge
and, more important, because of psychological factors. We wish to believe that accidents only hap-
pen to the other fellow. It is significant in this regard that most drivers take out more liability in-
surance (i.e., for an accident to the other fellow) than personal accident insurance.
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goal we could best achieve it through some form of social insurance. Enter-
prise liability is important because it could give us something more. It
would discourage accidents through economic pressure, and it would dis-
courage all accidents, not just those caused through traditional negligence.
Of course, I am aware that economic pressure for safety is more im-
portant in some industries than others. In the automobile industry safety
does not "sell." Thus economic pressure on car manufacturers is more im-
portant than economic pressure on airlines, who are already extremely
safety conscious. But there is no doubt that general deterrence has a role,
to play even in the aviation industry.!
One final point. There has been some discussion at this conference about
the collateral benefits rule. It has been suggested that if a plaintiff receives
insurance or social security benefits, the airline's payment should be re-
duced accordingly. But if an airline's payments are reduced because of
collateral benefits, part of the cost of aviation accidents is removed from
the activity of flying." This externalization reduces general deterrence. If
we are really that concerned about the plaintiff's excessive recovery we
should contrive some way to permit the collateral benefits to be reduced
because of the airline payments.
'In particular, increased economic pressure would stimulate more extensive research into safer
materials, methods, etc.
'I am assuming that the collateral benefits derive from some source other than flight insurance.
If they derive from flight insurance, no externalization takes place, since the cost of the premium
is a cost of flying and no other activity. Contrast accident and life insurance premiums, which are
in part a cost of flying but are chiefly a cost of myriad other activities.
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